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0ABSTRACT
To what extent can Amartya Sen’s ideas on freedom and especially his conceptuali-
sation of development as freedom enrich feminist economics? The notion of positive free-
dom that Sen employs has many attractions and provides important opportunities to
analyse gender inequalities. Sen’s increasing emphasis on freedom as the dominant overall
value to evaluate individual well being and societal development also contains risks, not
least for feminist analysis. We characterise the risks as ‘under-elaboration’ and ‘over-
extension’ of the concept of freedom. Drawing on Sen’s earlier work and various feminist
theorists, we suggest instead a more emphatically pluralist characterisation of capability,
well being and value. We illustrate this with reference to women’s economic role as care
givers.
11. INTRODUCTION
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom (1999) presents freedom as the central
value in development. ‘Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this approach, both as the pri-
mary end and as the principal means of development’ (p.xii). He emphasises ‘positive
freedom’, the capacity to be and do, rather than only ‘negative freedom’, freedom from
interference; and that sometimes this freedom depends more on the government than on
markets. This view of freedom, as positive as well as negative freedom, is an important
commonality between Sen and feminist economics.
Sen’s ideas on freedom have significantly influenced feminist development eco-
nomics. He has addressed for example what Diane Elson and Nilufer Cagatay (2000) list as
the three gender biases of macro economic policy: male breadwinner bias, commodifica-
tion bias, and deflationary bias. He points in each case at the importance of positive free-
dom for women and men alike: in his analysis of women’s poverty at household level,
where he detects the breadwinner ideology as one of the causes of female poverty (Sen,
1984a); in his analysis of freedom from hunger, where he probes the results of the com-
modification of food in times of hunger (1989); and in his analysis of financial conserva-
tism (1998).
Throughout his work, Sen also recognises other values than desire-fulfilment and
freedom, like values of justice, of democracy, and of connectedness. In this paper, we try
to assess to what extent Sen’s recent increasingly strong focus on freedom helps feminist
economists. First, we will elucidate his conception of positive freedom, embodied in his
capability approach and expanded in his philosophy of development as freedom, and its
value for feminist economics. Secondly we present what seem to us its shortcomings. As
indicated by our title, this paper primarily addresses Development as Freedom, not only the
earlier and narrower statements of a capability approach. Thirdly we outline a comple-
mentary or broadened approach, building from Sen’s own work on a variety of values. It
more emphatically highlights and examines a plurality of human values and of types of
capability, as for example in Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’. Freedom is best
seen as a particular family of values which must be embedded within other types of values,
including of caring. We illustrate the critique and the proposal with reference to the unpaid
care economy.
2We will conclude that Sen’s recent focus on freedom provides an important space
for gender-aware evaluation of female and male well being. The capability approach was
devised however to refine the evaluation of well being and quality of life. It is less ade-
quate for other tasks, such as description, understanding, explanation, persuasion and per-
haps prescription related to well being from a gender-aware perspective. For such tasks we
require a broadened picture.
 
2. SEN’S CAPABILITY APPROACH AND ‘DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM’
 2.1 Negative freedom and positive freedom
Many feminists have struggled for freedom for women, in particular freedom from
patriarchy: freedom as more choices, ranging from access to abortion to access to educa-
tion, freedom as better choices in women’s personal lives such as through reliable contra-
ceptives or at work through women’s unions, and freedom from oppression in public life as
well as private life. Freedom has undoubtedly been, and remains, an important value in the
women’s movement, feminist theory and feminist economics.
In mainstream economics, freedom is typically interpreted as ‘negative freedom’,
the absence of coercion and interference by others, and specifically as the absence of gov-
ernment ‘interference’ in the market. That is the meaning given to ‘free market’. It is a
freedom-from, freedom from constraints on one’s choices in markets, leaving producers
and consumers Free to Choose, as a book by Milton and Rose Friedman (1980) has it. This
negative freedom is accorded instrumental value as a means to promote well-being,
through individual choice, well-functioning markets, and GDP growth. Real income is
used as a measure of positive freedom, the ability to attain desired ends, albeit for many
reasons an imperfect measure.
MacCallum and others have shown how statements about freedom implicitly use
the form ‘Agent X is free from constraint Y on doing/being/becoming Z, which is an im-
portant value’ (William Connolly 1983). Thus both aspects - constraining factors (Y;
‘negative’) and valuable attainable life-states (Z; ‘positive’) - are present, whether explic-
itly or not. Arguments that positive freedom is an illicit addition to the idea of freedom are
fallacious. Different conceptions of what are valuable life-states, and differences in the
judgement (both explanatory and ethical) of what are constraints will lead to different as-
3sessments of the degree of freedom that the agent enjoys. If a woman is free from legal
constraints to enter a public activity, but constrained by her commitments to care for old,
young or infirm family members, assessments of her freedom will reflect whether her par-
ticipation in the public activity is considered important and whether care is seen only as a
vocation and not also as a burden. The claim that the woman is ‘free’ to participate could
reflect a focus only on legal constraints and active prevention, based on a view that there
are no other ethically relevant constraints and on a voluntaristic conception of agency. For
Sen, this limited interpretation of freedom is problematic: what matters is what this woman
is really able to do and be.
Like Sen, feminist economists have criticised the predominant focus in much eco-
nomics on negative freedom (e.g. Julie Nelson 1996; Gillian Hewitson 1999; Graham
Dawson and Sue Hatt 2000) . They have argued that this implicitly idealises Man as inde-
pendent, already autonomous, rather than as a social being, socialised into the norms and
values of a community, cared for by parents, and having personal bonds as well as rights
and duties towards society (Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson 1993). The assumption of
independence of utility functions in mainstream economics is one example of the mascu-
line ideal of independence and autonomy (see, for example, Paula England 1993). Moreo-
ver, negative freedom, feminist development economists have argued, does not necessarily
reduce women’s poverty, increase their relative wages, or improve their share of consump-
tion and decision making within the household (e.g., Naila Kabeer, 1994; Diane Elson,
1995). Sometimes, more of it even makes things worse for women, and justice is called
for, or other values.
 
 2.2 Sen’s concern for positive freedom: the capability approach
Amartya Sen has placed his critique of a purely negative conception of freedom
within, first, a wider critique of various components in mainstream economics including its
rationality concept (Sen, 1977 and 1995) and utilitarianism (Sen, 1987), and second, an
emergent alternative framework. He stresses freedom in the positive sense of ability to
function well in life, in terms of ends that people ‘have reason to value’. He has contrib-
uted his ideas to the UNDP Human Development Reports, which provide broader meas-
4ures of welfare and poverty than per capita GDP, such as the Human Development Index
(HDI), the Human Poverty Index (HPI), and the Gender-related Development Index (GDI).
Sen’s capability approach includes several components, which need to be distin-
guished. Component 1 is an inclusive stance on the information relevant for evaluation of
well-being and quality of life: there are more types of information relevant than those con-
sidered by mainstream economics, viz., people’s incomes, assets, and utility satisfaction.
Centrally, we should also look at how people actually live, and at what degree of freedom
they have to choose how they live. To be precise, Sen argues in elaboration of Component
1 that looking at how much personal well-being agents achieve (well-being Achievement)
should include looking at their actual functionings; and also at what they were free to
achieve, both in terms of their own well-being (well-being Freedom) and of their actual
values, including their values for other people (Agency Freedom). His primary category of
capability is well being Freedom, which concerns the attainable functionings for the agent
herself.
Component 2 is a family of categories, a language for discussing these types of in-
formation. Functionings are components or aspects of how a person lives. Together a set
(vector or, more formally, n-tuple) of such functionings makes up a person’s life. A per-
son’s capability (capability set) is the set of alternative vectors of functionings she could
attain, the alternative lives open to her, the extent of her positive freedom. (Capabilities in
the plural refers for Sen to particular attainable functionings.)
Component 3 concerns which categories and levels have ethical priority. Sen seems
to use this ranking: 1 - capability, the set of life options a person is able to choose from;
placed first because of a priority to freedom; 2 - functionings, how a person actually lives;
placed above 3 - utility, meaning feelings of satisfaction or the fact of preference fulfil-
ment, since preferences may be unconsidered or have been formed under situations of dep-
rivation of information and of options; 4 - goods/commodities, placed last as a measure of
well-being, because people have different requirements. This normative priority to capa-
bility could be read as an evaluative rule that ‘capabilities are more valuable than func-
tionings’. If instead, or in addition, it is read as a policy rule to promote capabilities and
then ‘let people make their own mistakes’, that takes us to Component 4: priority to capa-
bility as a policy rule. Capability is here seen as an appropriate measure of advantage
5rather than of well being itself, though it might contribute to well being.
Component 5 goes further in prioritising: priority within the space of capabilities is
by the criterion of what ‘people have reason to value’. How to operationalise this idea in
multi-agent situations leads us to Component 6, stressed in Sen’s more recent work: public
procedures for prioritising and threshold setting, regarding which and whose capabilities
(e.g. 1999: 148).
The last component—Component 7— is less central but periodically found in Sen’s
specification: notions of basic capabilities (basic for survival or dignity) and required mini-
mum attainment levels. While these notions are ones most people find reason to value,
component 7 guards against cases where agents’ reason instead leads to behaviour damag-
ing to the agents or to others.
Sen’s positive notion of freedom can be applied to men and women alike and is
potentially sensitive to gender inequalities in social structures (for example, social security
systems that depend on families having someone in formal employment), in norms (for
example, purdah), and in economic institutions (for example, gendered job segregation).
On the basis of Sen’s approach, it is possible to more clearly assess how women’s freedom
to live the lives that they value is generally less than men’s freedom to do so: women have
lower levels of education, women suffer reproductive health risks, women’s behaviour in
the public domain is often restricted by gender norms, and they suffer from labour market
discrimination, just to mention a few gendered ‘unfreedoms’. He has vividly analysed
women’s economic position in various publications.
 
 2.3 From the Capability Approach to ‘Development as Freedom’
Sen’s capability approach has grown since the mid 1980s from a position in welfare
economics to become a wide-ranging development philosophy, presented at length in 1999
in his book Development as Freedom. The combination of concerns for positive freedom
and for replacement of per capita GDP with human development indicators seems to have
led him in the direction of an increasingly unified conception of development as freedom.
He now highlights the ethical status of freedom, as the major means and end of develop-
ment, dominating the specification of other values (1999: xii, 148). Over time, he has put
increased stress in assessing well-being and advantage on the priority of capability seen as
6opportunity, and on procedures of local prioritisation within that space (components 3 and
6 above); at the expense relatively speaking of component 7, a universal specification of
basic requirements.
The labelling of development as freedom is perhaps in part strategic: Development
as Freedom evolved from a series of lectures for the World Bank and seeks to influence
audiences in mainstream development economics and seats of power (Des Gasper, 2000).
More than that, Sen’s capability approach is centrally about choice of an evaluative space:
that we should measure advantage by the extent of valued opportunities which individuals
have; and it contains no sharply formed views about which opportunities people should
have.
Sen certainly accepts that there are other values, notably justice in the distribution
of resources, but seems not to treat them fully on the same basis as freedom. First, he
wishes to incorporate many values within his freedom framework by talking about the
freedom to attain those things which one has reason to value. Second, he seems thus to
wish to leave other values open for—free—specification in situ. Implicitly, none reflect
essential features of humanity, in his view. Instead his framework seem to be neutral be-
tween, as well as open to, other values. Thirdly, justice in the distribution of advantages
depends logically on clarification first of the nature of advantage. For these reasons, he
sees his freedom framework as the primary framework. He accepts that there are limits of
the capability approach; for example, limits to a principle of equalising even basic capa-
bilities, when we realise for example that women have inherently greater life expectancy.
But as is clear from this example, he sees the limitations as secondary qualifications
around a valid primary emphasis.
The next section takes a more critical view of how Sen has so far used and ex-
tended his positive concept of freedom. A conception created to improve evaluation—by
identifying the dimensions of opportunity and functionings in contrast to felt satisfaction,
goods obtained, or other measures of real income—may not suffice for wider purposes. For
description, explanation and prescription there are important building blocks from other
parts of Sen’s work, such as the concepts of sympathy and commitment, and in the work of
Martha Nussbaum and others.
 
73. SHORTCOMINGS IN SEN’S DEGREE OF EMPHASIS ON FREEDOM
 3.1 An Under-Elaborated and Over-Extended Notion of Freedom
While Sen’s notion of freedom centres on positive freedom, it remains in some key
respects under-characterised in Development as Freedom. He writes extensively about ‘un-
freedoms’, and it becomes clear what are the ‘bads’ when freedom is lacking. But we do
not get a clear picture of the content of freedom itself, including the varieties, skills, dispo-
sitions and preconditions involved; it is instead an abstracted, umbrella category.
For Sen, freedom becomes the dominant evaluative space for human well being,
subsuming many different ends. He uses the word when indicating the relevance of various
goods in life, such as knowledge or health (freedom from ignorance, freedom from illness).
All the capabilities that human beings could acquire are to be understood as freedoms. This
inevitably makes the notion of freedom broad, vague and potentially confusing. There is no
longer a highlighted distinction between the value of autonomous agency and all the op-
portunities to achieve other values which may be provided through such agency.1 These
two aspects of positive freedom deserve separation.
The focus on freedom (negative as well as positive) runs the risk of downgrading be-
haviour that contributes to well being which is not part of individual autonomy. It may ne-
glect evaluations of well being in terms of social relations and personal relationships, im-
portant sources of women’s well being as well as a result of women’s joint efforts to create
well-being for others. With subsuming of other values within freedom, rather than empha-
sising development as relating to a multitude of distinct human values, which demand
separate attention, the distinctive substantive contents of specific values can become ob-
scured.  We shall investigate the importance of highlighting distinctive values, by exam-
ples from Sen’s own rich and insightful work on democracy, respect and friendship, which
can be used to extend his capability approach.
 
 3.2 The Importance of Other Values
The ‘Development As [not Is] Freedom’ formulation leaves space for asking: And
development (desirable change, desirable states) as what else also? Sen has packaged so
much into his notion of positive freedom that he now says relatively little on what else.
The instrumental roles of other values, towards other things considered important, may be
8subsumable into his freedom language, since that is formulated in terms of ability to effect
whatever one has reason to value; and he often seems to deal with their independent im-
portance likewise. When our agenda is explanation and prescription, not only evaluation, a
more differentiated language becomes essential. We will consider here the values of de-
mocracy, respect and friendship.
In his work on famines and hunger (1981a), Sen argues that democracy in addition
to being valuable in itself has major instrumental contributions, in particular that democra-
cies prevent famines. Democracy is not merely the value that people can choose freely, but
a value that sometimes challenges freedom, and is even called sometimes to discipline
freedom when freedom allocates food to where purchasing power is, rather than to where it
is mostly needed. In his current language of development as freedom, the need for democ-
racy to discipline freedom (such as the positive freedom to speculate in basic commodities)
might become obscured.
Prioritisation of poor people’s subsistence and survival over affluent people’s val-
ued freedoms (as in component 7 above) could require rooting in a national constitution or
bill of rights. Otherwise, a language of promotion of valued positive freedoms could be-
come used or misused to cloak massive injustice. Affluent people’s freedoms can be de
facto prioritised, through elaborate formal democratic procedures (as in component 6), in
polities such as India’s. With all priorities supposedly coming from a locally specified proc-
ess of debate, consultation and decision, the outcome in practice can be harshly elitist, thanks
to the power of wealth, established authority and differential access. The capabilities and
functionings of one gender, for example, may concern public officials more than those of the
other gender, even when reasoning from a human development perspective, as Thanh-Dam
Truong (1997) has argued. As we see later, Martha Nussbaum therefore in her version of
the capability approach adds a Rawlsian difference principle; and other responses having
the same function are possible.
Another example of a value, which is different from freedom, is the value of re-
spect. Again it has both independent and instrumental significance. Poverty is not only
characterised by a lack of money or material resources but just as much by a lack of re-
spect from others (Sen, 1984b). Being respected is a significant factor in growing out of
poverty, and in turn involves and affects capabilities of self-esteem and confidence. Self-
9esteem appears frequently as a vital first step for women to improve their well being, for
example through education or joining women’s NGOs. Interestingly again, an all-
encompassing single language of freedom may not help in noting this. Women may be free
to join a credit programme, but without the self-confidence that they are able to engage in a
business activity, they will not seek credit. It is not a lack of freedom that hinders them to
access credit, but a lack of (self-) respect. When Sen comes to list sources of interpersonal
variation in well-being in Development as Freedom, conspicuous by their absence are self-
esteem and related learned capacities (1999: 70-1, 88-90; and Gasper, 2000).
Friendship appears as another important value, having its own set of capabilities as
skills. Sen has shown the instrumental importance of friendship—provided it is held as an
independent value. His example features Donna who is committed to save the life of her
friend Ali who would become victim of a planned racist attack (Sen, 1981b). In a utilitar-
ian calculation, the benefits from the attack to the group of attackers might be greater than
the costs to just one person, hence the principle of utility maximisation might not help Ali.
As for recourse to the forces of justice, Sen tells us that the police dismisses Donna’s story
as a fantasy. Although Ali may be entitled to police protection, he does not get it. An alter-
native for her would be to break into the office of someone who happens to know where
Ali is, but that would violate the law as well as the other person’s privacy. Hence, Sen
suggests with this story, the only value available to Donna which might save her friend Ali
is her friendship. Committed as she is to her friend she is determined to find a way to save
him, although it would cost time and effort and possibly also risk her becoming the next
target of the attackers. In Sen‘s language, this is commitment, which means an agent fol-
lows values whose fulfilment does not raise her own satisfaction. In contrast, sympathy
means that an agent’s satisfaction is favourably affected by increase in well being for an-
other.
While the case could still be described using Sen’s language of capability as posi-
tive freedom, that does not seem the most enlightening way. It is not Ali’s free agency or
his rights, but his close relationship with Donna that will help him eventually out of the
threatening situation. Friendship is a value that in a particular case contributes more effec-
tively to further individual well being than the value of freedom is able to do.
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 3.3 Freedom Plus
So the language of freedom could sometimes hinder us from attending to important
matters. A conception of Human Development, as essayed by UNDP, needs more than one
value. Freedom is not enough, even in a version that includes reference to other values, and
even when supplemented by a justice criterion. We are also not only interested in whether
a girl had the potential, the positive freedom, to be healthy, but also in how healthy she is.
We are not only interested in whether India has the potential to educate all its girls, but
also whether it does so: both how far a society enjoys the possibility of fulfilment of im-
portant values and how far it fulfils them. In the Human Development Index two of the
dimensions—knowledge and longevity—do directly reflect valuable functionings, not only
the potential for such. That capability must often be measured via the proxy of functioning
has been fortunate, for we need to measure functionings in their own right.
Freedom to choose among capabilities is only one relevant space for evaluation,
even for individuals. For individuals it is relevant for adults more than children. Capability
theory began as a statement in welfare economics (Sen, 1985), calling for reference to
more than utilities, incomes and purchases. Over time Sen has put increasing emphasis on
the dimension of capability as opportunity, even relative to functionings. But it remains
just one dimension, even for the welfare economics exercise of judging the advantage of
the responsible adult. For judging, and influencing, the state of human development of a
society, we need to consider far more.
Sen provides a space for other values through his flexible phrase ‘what we have
reason to value’. ‘To value’ is, in his usage, something more considered, more reasoned
than a mere preference, urge, habit or whimsy; and to underline this he adds the phrase
‘have reason to’. Sebastian Silva Leander (2001) suggests that Sen’s capability notion
should more clearly distinguish two types of freedom: having options, which connects to
Kant’s concept of external freedom; and secondly, being able to make independent well-
reasoned choices, which connects to Kant’s internal freedom concept. For Kant, internal
freedom was central in his conceptions of humanity and progress. With autonomy seen as
positive freedom (e.g. Connolly, 1983), we appreciate that autonomy is a matter of degree
and can then, with for example Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991), distinguish autonomy of
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agency (being able to function competently as a member of one’s society) and critical
autonomy (being able also to independently assess one’s society’s dominant values).
Lawrence Hamilton (1999) argues that Sen holds back from a more substantive
theory of values and needs because of excessive faith in a thinly specified version of prac-
tical reason. Persons are presumed rational and non-vicious, at least if provided with in-
formation, basic training (thus the theory applies for adults) and opportunities for public
debate. These requirements are important but not sufficient for reasonableness. Sen in any
case assumes, and advocates, a viable liberal democratic state, where basic rights can be
articulated, operationalised and respected, for every group in society. In a market domi-
nated, money dominated world with only a compass of the reasons-to-value set within ex-
isting polities, his capability approach faces some risk of being subordinated by what
comes out of such market and money dominated processes, unless combined with richer
languages for analysis and evaluation. If partnered similarly by richer pictures of person-
hood, the capability approach might help in identifying and facing consumerism.2
The ‘Development as Freedom’ formulation thus needs to be embedded in a
broader picture of human values and with attention to ‘internal freedom’. We sketch in the
next section a move from a thinner and more unitary picture of persons and values to a
thicker and more plural picture, to give a more adequately situated concept of freedom,
drawing on Sen’s own earlier work.
 
4. A SITUATED AND MORE SUBSTANTIVE NOTION OF FREEDOM
In this section, we consider responses to the under-definition and over-extension of
Sen’s positive notion of freedom. As remedy for under-definition, we outline aspects of the
thicker notion presented by Martha Nussbaum et al. As remedy for over-extension, we em-
phasise the non-hierarchical relationship between a plurality of values that together make
up well being or development. We will illustrate this in the subsequent section, with refer-
ence to the values of caring and to women’s role in providing unpaid care.
 
 4.1. Combating Under-Definition with the help of Nussbaum
Sen presents a richer picture of persons than Rational Economic Man. He notes the
possibility of what he calls sympathy and commitment; and he notes preferences about
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preferences, as part of reasoning about preference. However the picture remains predomi-
nantly one of reasoning choosers rather than more richly scripted actors. The conception of
freedom as opportunity is an abstracted one, about possibilities in a given context, not a
substantive conception about psychic states, capacities and propensities.
In defining capability as positive freedom, Sen has built on a usage, which is less
common in everyday language. More common there is the sense of capability as a skill or
aptitude. We can call this S-capability (S for skill) and Sen’s sense O-capability (O for op-
tions and opportunity). The S-capability sense is elaborated by Nussbaum, who speaks of
‘internal capability’. It is essential in description, explanation and thus also for more
grounded prescription. An opportunity set is not a picture of presented or agency. Theorising
capability only as opportunities and not also as skills and traits will limit us in building a more
structured picture of personhood and agency. It can lead to underemphasis on key require-
ments for ‘free choice’, and underestimation of the extent of deprivation. We agree with
David Crocker (1995: 182) that: ‘Sen’s theory of actual freedom would be more compre-
hensive and humanly nuanced if he followed Nussbaum and added internal powers to ex-
ternal opportunities and viewed humans not only as capable but as in need of nurture in a
context of neediness.’
Nussbaum gives a richer, and a more gender balanced, picture of thought and emo-
tion, and of influences on them; and is thus stronger than Sen on meanings and action, in-
cluding on emotional development and on giving meaning to and making use of freedom.
Her approach may have greater potential to understand the requirements of action and to
motivate it (Nussbaum, 2000; IDEA, 2001).
The broader definition of capabilities, distinguishing both opportunities and skills,
makes her approach less abstract than Sen’s and closer to the texture of daily life. She pro-
poses in Nussbaum (2000) ten sets of priority human functional capabilities, under the
headings: 1. life, 2. bodily health, 3. bodily integrity, 4. senses, imagination, and thought,
5. emotions; 6. practical reason; 7. affiliation (‘Being able to live with and toward oth-
ers…[and] Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation…‘ (p.79); 8. other
species (‘Being able to live with concern for, and in relation to, animals, plants and the
world of nature’, p.80); 9. play; and 10. control over one’s environment. These capabilities
are a combination of skills and opportunities. Some are internal capabilities of a person,
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like emotions, which require training and maturation but then do not depend on outside
resources, unlike for example bodily health. They cannot all be well understood as free-
doms. Capability for affiliation is only in part a freedom, as in the ILO Convention for
workers’ right to freedom of association; affiliation depends also upon intimate relation-
ships between people, rather than their independence and autonomy.
Nussbaum notes that ‘I am not pushing individuals into the function: once the stage
is fully set, the choice is up to them.’ (2000: 88; emphasis added). But this choice is em-
bedded in individuals’ social networks like families and communities, and ‘the capabilities
are an interlocking set; they support one another, and an impediment to one impedes oth-
ers.’ (p. 294).
Nussbaum stresses minimum thresholds for individual well being. Each citizen
should enjoy minimum levels of capability before full freedom should be allowed to attain
high levels for those who have the means to do so. She has also proposed a Rawlsian dif-
ference principle: inequalities in capabilities can be tolerated as long as these differences
lead to more people attaining the threshold (Nussbaum, 1995: 87).
This approach to capabilities moves away from the dominant focus on freedom into
the direction of an interlocking set of values, reflected by a diversity of capabilities. For
women, Nussbaum notes, this view offers a way out of the dichotomy between exclusive
individual freedom on the one hand and traditional women’s roles on the other hand.
Nussbaum’s approach of a pluralist set of capabilities promises that ‘we are not forced to
choose between a deracinated type of individualism, where each person goes off as a loner,
indifferent to others, and traditional types of community, which are frequently hierarchical
and unfair to women’(2000: 289).
Nussbaum’s approach also enables one to transcend the common dichotomy of
masculine and feminine attributions of human agency (reason versus emotion, calculation
versus interpretation, or independence versus dependence). Importantly, Nussbaum goes
beyond such dualities, to argue for concrete human capabilities, addressing not only indi-
vidualistic needs, but also social and inter-personal ones. Her approach is more open to
highlight community and family as essential spheres.
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach has its own limitations. It explicitly acknowl-
edges that it is oriented to the design of political constitutions and policy frameworks
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rather than the details of poverty research and administration, since it does not indicate
how to measure the various capabilities and cannot easily be employed in a quantitative
cost-benefit analysis (Nussbaum, 1999: 236). And although her list of ten priority capa-
bilities has evolved and improved over several years of scholarly debate, and contains con-
siderable room for plural versions and different local specifications, it will always be con-
testable (Fabienne Peter, 2001). It should be understood instead as an exemplar of an ap-
propriately substantive agenda for discussion of priorities and basic rights—criteria for ‘a
decent social minimum in a variety of areas’ (Nussbaum 2000: 75)—not as a universal blue-
print. The list can be presented as a framework for dialogical investigation. A helpful set of
papers on such issues and her approach’s contributions and limits is found in IDEA (2001).
 
 4.2. Combating Over-Extension: Highlighting Other Values As Elsewhere In Sen’s
Work
A variety of authors, such as Michael Walzer (1983) and Elizabeth Anderson
(1993), suggest that values of freedom be seen as just one relevant sphere amongst others.
For those authors, freedom is distinct from and even incommensurable with other values.
This situated notion of freedom ensures recognition of the importance of other values, and
implies a more modest value on freedom than when it is understood as an overall or domi-
nant characterisation of development. The more clearly defined, and the better distin-
guished from other values, the more meaningful freedom in fact becomes as a value oper-
ating in economic processes.
Irene van Staveren (2001) has tried to link the idea of a range of distinct values to
specific capabilities that are phrased in terms of these respective values. She emphasises
three spheres of values in economic life—of freedom, justice, and caring—each encom-
passing a variety of incommensurable values that are, however, not unrelated to one an-
other. Caring appears here as a critical sphere that must be added to Sen’s freedom-and-
justice framework. Freedom is a family of values related to the self and what one can do.
Next to the self-related values of freedom, a sphere of public values of justice can be rec-
ognised, including values of respect and solidarity, as well as a sphere of inter-personal
values of caring which characterise relationships between people, for example expressing
trust in a community and responsibility among family members. For values of freedom,
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individuals may acquire capabilities related to free choices, autonomy, self-esteem, and
most of all: individual agency. But having freedom of choice, for example, will not be par-
ticularly helpful for someone who is in mourning because his parents have died. The per-
son’s well-being in that situation will benefit more from friends who comfort, as well as
from joint participation in a funeral ceremony which is appropriate for the cultural context.
So, another set of values requires another set of capabilities. Values of justice, for example,
are reflected in capabilities for solidarity, collective action, and respect for other human
beings as well as animals and the natural environment.
These three spheres are not independent from each other: freedom enables justice
and caring but also constrains these, whereas in turn, the values of justice and caring are
similarly related to each other and to freedom. Just as Nussbaum argues regarding her set
of priority capabilities, so too the values underlying capabilities should be understood as
highly interdependent: one cannot be well attained without the others. The values can be
thought of as continuously balancing each other, at the macro level as well as at the micro
level of an individual agent. Too much caring will limit women’s freedom, for example,
and reflects an unfair distribution of the burden of caring labour in the household with
men. But too much freedom, as independence from a household and community, will limit
an individual’s well-being in times of scarcity or illness: others will not feel responsible to
help someone who has refused to contribute to social networks of mutual help in the past.
Opportunities to receive care when needed will be diminished by an exclusive pursuit of
freedom.
 
5. WOMEN’S ROLE AS CARE GIVERS
Let us consider women’s role as unpaid caregivers for the family and community, a
role assigned to women worldwide. How far can the issues arising be understood in Sen’s
framework of development as freedom?
In Chapter 8 of Development as Freedom, Sen argues for gender policies to focus
on women’s capability and agency rather than the traditional focus on women’s disadvan-
taged levels of functionings. For him, such a focus on women’s agency—their formation,
pursuit and attainment of goals—often implies promoting paid work outside the home for
women, leading to their own independent incomes. ‘So the freedom to seek and hold out-
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side jobs can contribute to the reduction of women’s relative - and absolute - deprivation’
(Sen, 1999: 194). Paid jobs help women to become financially independent from their hus-
bands and fathers and to make their own choices in consumer and financial markets. Femi-
nist economists have underpinned this relationship between paid employment and well
being by their critique of the model of the unitary household and by analysis of women’s
bargaining position. Sen adds that the freedom that goes with paid labour brings important
values for women such as self-esteem, dignity, and autonomy, values long reserved for
(white) men only.3 And he elaborates the effects of greater bargaining power in and outside
the household: ‘Freedom in one area (that of being able to work outside the household)
seems to help to foster freedom in others (in enhancing freedom from hunger, illness and
relative deprivation)’ (idem: 194).
However, women’s working lives include a large share of unpaid labour, making
up a major part of the care economy (see e.g. Nancy Folbre & Julie Nelson, 2000). This
unpaid care economy is highly significant: it consists of production on a vast scale of
goods and services for the benefit of others (households, family members, communities).
Estimates of its monetary value, on the basis of opportunity costs of women’s time, range
from 6% to 55% of GNP as presently calculated (Marga Bruyn-Hundt, 1996: 51). The un-
paid care economy is qualitatively essential since although some of the goods and services
produced have market substitutes, many do not. If women did not care for children beyond
the level of care as provided in child care organisations, for example, the market would
hardly do it either. Similarly it is hard to buy friendship, or understanding and comfort in a
mourning process. In addition, caring labour produces more than just goods and services: it
generates and cherishes a set of values at the same time, interpersonal values of belonging
and sharing.
Caring values include responsibility, loyalty, generosity, and trust. Many women
value caring and find meaning, even part of their identity, in caring for others. They see the
complementarity with market production, and they recognise the important contribution of
caring to the well being of those cared for. But caring should not be romanticised, just like
paid labour does not only bring benefits but costs as well (wage discrimination, sexual har-
assment, and pressure on one’s health, for example). Caring is a burden to care givers; it
takes time, energy, and emotional commitment, as well as accompanying resources. These
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burdens are, as Nancy Folbre and Thomas Weisskopf (1998) note, largely designated to
women, based on traditional gender norms, backed by power and coercion. The far greater
share of time that women spend on caring, compared to men, could be characterised as
‘socially imposed altruism’ on women, as Lee Badgett and Nancy Folbre have argued
(1999: 316). Martha Nussbaum (1995) points out how complex the relation between caring
and women’s well-being is, recognising the material and emotional benefits as well as the
pains that go with intimate relationships, particularly when a relationship is characterised
by dependency.
So, the role of women as care givers is complementary to market production, in-
volving the production of some goods and services which markets are unable to provide,
and reflecting values of belonging and sharing, which are different values from those of
freedom. It involves a burden, which often limits women’s capabilities related to freedom:
their financial independence and their self-esteem as workers. Care affects the capabilities
and functionings of both the caregiver and receiver. There will be a positive effect on the
care receiver’s functionings, but often lowered functionings for the caregiver. Care in-
volves time that goes without compensation, and generally ties one to the care receiver,
often close to the home.
There is more going on in the activity of caring. As a practice between care giver
and care receiver it generates a caring capability of individual agents. This capability is a
set of intangible, informally acquired skills and values consisting of (1) attentiveness to the
needs of others, (2) responsibility to address these needs, even if these do not arise from
consequences of our own actions, (3) competence in addressing these needs well, and (4)
responsiveness of the care receiver to the care giver, as a feedback into the caring process
(Joan Tronto, 1993).
Just as the capabilities of freedom, like self-esteem and self-confidence, contribute
to the functioning of the economy, so do the capabilities of caring. Caring capabilities in
economic life strengthen economic processes by generating trust (both trusting and trust-
worthiness), taking responsibility for externalities of one’s market behaviour, communica-
tion (through engaging in human relationships), and interpretation (of others’ economic
position in terms of their resources, skills, bargaining power, demand, etc.). Without such
capabilities, economic processes would be characterised by tremendous transaction costs,
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high externalities, and strong volatility and uncertainty in production, investment and con-
sumption levels (Irene van Staveren, 2001).
So, both at the macro level as well as at the micro level – in households and in
communities – caring contributes to people’s capabilities, functionings and in the end, to
their well-being, although the distribution of costs and benefits is very uneven. On average
women undertake about three-quarters of the caring work in the world, while at the same
time men do most of the paid work and earn the larger share of income (UNDP, 1995).
In Sen’s framework of development as freedom, there is (and rightly so) much at-
tention for increased freedom for women through paid employment. However, if women
would all engage more in paid employment (with increased labour force participation in
numbers of women as well as in hours per woman), who would do the unpaid caring?
Women could become overburdened with a double workday, or lots of caring needs could
be left unaddressed. Hence, there may sometimes be a trade off in development between
women’s freedom and care. And as seen when women do not take paid labour but special-
ise in unpaid caring labour, there is a trade off between their freedom and that of the cared
for, and hence a question of justice.
It might be possible to enable women’s increased labour force participation while
reducing the impact on care by redistributing some caring work to men. For the sake of
women’s functionings, this is essential. A more balanced distribution of paid and unpaid
labour over men and women would have another benefit, the generation of a wider set of
capabilities for both women and men: freedom-type capabilities, like independence and
self-esteem, and caring-type capabilities, like responsibility and affection.
But such redistribution of unpaid caring labour from women to men would not fit
easily with a view of development as freedom. The challenge would be to convince men to
take their fair share in household-, childcare and community-work. It is hard to see how
this could be done by referring to someone’s individual freedom: how can men be con-
vinced to do more unpaid caring labour, in terms of a discourse of increase of freedom? As
women know from experience, housework and childcare may bring various satisfactions,
but not freedom. It is the lack of freedom that goes with caring which led Sen to emphasise
paid employment in the first place.
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An alternative would lie in emphasising the plurality of development, beyond free-
dom. This means the recognition of capabilities and functionings not only in terms of val-
ues related to the self, values that increase one’s independence and autonomy, but also in
terms of values related to relationships with others, as well as values related to fairness of
distribution. The claims of justice themselves may become better grounded and more per-
suasive, a basis for accepted duties and not only claimed rights, through this more substan-
tive attention to personhood and to experiences of care.
 
5. CONCLUSION
We have analysed the focus in Sen’s capability approach on freedom, as the princi-
pal means and end of development. Sen’s notion of capability and its connection to posi-
tive freedom prove to be more useful for gender-aware analysis and the study of women’s
well-being than the neoclassical ideas of utility and negative freedom. His concern with
autonomous agency helps economists to analyse women’s freedom to live the lives they
have reason to value and to identify the constraints to this freedom.
In comparison to his earlier work, where he analysed a wide variety of human val-
ues next to freedom, his now increased emphasis on freedom appears less sufficient for the
tasks of describing, explaining and motivating, and then developing policy recommenda-
tions; especially for those economic roles of women that are tied to different values, such
as values of solidarity or connectedness. We identified two main shortcomings in his
treatment of development as freedom. First, we noted an over-extension of the emphasis on
freedom at the cost of other values, to the extent that all capabilities that women and men
could acquire are now to be understood as freedoms. However, some important values, such
as those associated with friendship, respect and care, cannot be adequately understood in
terms of individual freedom. Second, we found the concept of freedom to be under-
elaborated, since it lacks sufficient distinction between autonomous agency on the one
hand and the variety of values which may be promoted through such agency on the other
hand; and also between capability as a set of opportunities, and capabilities as skills and
capacities that can be nurtured. We agree with Ingrid Robeyns (2001) that Sen’s capability
approach is, deliberately, underspecified, and thus at risk of being combined with ques-
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tionable, not least gender-biased, partners. The risk increases if it is perceived as a general
purpose philosophy of development, unless the approach is refined and complemented.
To address these shortcomings, we have argued for an explicit stress on other val-
ues equally important as freedom, values, which too are means and ends of development.
This requires recognition of different capabilities, as valuable in their own terms, not only
as examples of freedom, but not unrelated to each other. Freedom should be emphatically
embedded within a fuller picture of other values and needs. This suggestion draws on
Sen’s earlier work, in which he shows the contribution of values like democracy, respect
and friendship to well being and development. These varied values and the corresponding
valuable capabilities require more specific and substantive designation, investigation and
support than in the generalised language of ‘development as freedom’. Here we endorse
aspects of the work of Nancy Folbre, Julie Nelson and Martha Nussbaum, amongst others.
Without this sort of more substantive theory of personhood, the capability approach’s lan-
guage of freedom is more easily co-opted by questionable and gender-biased partners.
We suggested moreover that promotion of individual well-being, in particular the
well-being of women which in so many respects lags behind that of men, benefits from a
recognition of minimum required levels of some priority capabilities and functionings, or
thresholds as Nussbaum has called these minimums. The attainment of minimum levels
would be prioritised over the freedom of those who have already reached higher levels to
further increase their well being.
Finally, we proposed that such pluralist understanding of capabilities would help to
acknowledge the contribution of women as care givers as well as the constraints of this
role on women’s freedom. On grounds of both personal development and justice, it be-
comes possible to argue for a redistribution of care giving from women to men - enabling
women’s freedom as well as men’s contribution to caring.
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ENDNOTES
                                                
 1 Paul Seabright (2001: 42) remarks that: ‘the wish to see freedom as the fundamental value underlying every
other even leads Sen at one point to talk about mortality as a denial of ‘the freedom to survive.’ Well, yes,
one can call it that, but is it really illuminating to suggest that what matters about being dead is the lack of
freedom that goes with it? Being dead is also bad for the health and has a significant statistical association
with dropping out of college, but personally I think it’s the deadness that would bother me.’ Sen in fact refers
to the freedom to survive, not to the freedom that survival brings, but his wish to bring so much under the
label of freedom gives potential for confusion of this sort. And what of the right to survive?
2 In the language of freedom and capability as opportunity alone, the issue of excess of freedom hardly seems to
arise. Sen does direct us to look at valued positive freedom, the holding of valuable options; but in practice a pre-
sumption can easily enter that more freedom (‘real’ freedom) is always good.
3 In two volumes on freedom in economics, the following values and constitutive elements of freedom are
listed: choice, free exchange, opportunity, individual will, agency, independence, exercise of one’s capaci-
ties, intentional action, self-creation, self-determination, awareness, self-esteem, value in the eyes of others,
dignity and pride (Alan Peacock, 1997; Francois Laslier, Marc Fleurbaey, Nicolas Gravel, and Alain Tran-
noy, 1998).
